I. INTRODUCTION
The extent to which foreign corporations as well as their domestic subsidiaries can discriminate against American employees on the basis of sex, age, religion, and national origin in a manner that would be acceptable under their own laws and customs but inimical to American law is currently determined by a muddled jumble of circuit court opinions interpreting a "[w]e express no view" Supreme Court footnote.
1 As a result, American victims of sexual discrimination have much less protection under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 when the discriminating actor is a foreign corporation or its domestic subsidiary than they do when the discrimination is by a wholly domestic corporation. This results from the courts' interpretations of the relationship between a common Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) provision that allows foreign corporations to hire executive-level employees "of their choice," and Title VII and its § 703 bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception 3 that allows discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin (but not race) for certain jobs.
This Article will argue that this result, repugnant to the purpose of civil rights laws, is the result of a series of badly reasoned courts of appeal cases and a lack of guidance by the Supreme Court. However, because of the current Court's stance in civil rights cases, now is perhaps not the best time for certiorari on any of the issues raised herein. This Article will focus generally on sex discrimination under Title VII, and will focus specifically on Japanese companies and their subsidiaries, 4 although the cases involve other countries and other antidiscrimination provisions.
1I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT VERSUS THE FCN TREATY

A. The Civil Rights Act
Title VII states in pertinent part: [Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
To determine whether a company is a company of the United States or a company of Japan it is necessary to look at Article XXII(3) of the Japanese Treaty which states:
As used in the present Treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party.
14 Thus, any American corporation, even if it is the wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese corporation, is an American corporation under Article XXII(3) of the Japanese Treaty and is not entitled to the protection of Article VIII(l) in the United States; or at least this would seem to be the case. But, in fact, it is not, in the viewpoints of several circuits, as the cases below will demonstrate.
C. The Act Versus the Treaty
Most of the treaties being considered were negotiated in the immediate aftermath of World War II, prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Should the subsequent legislation affect existing treaties? Turning to the issue of the Treaty versus domestic American antidiscrimination statutes, one court concluded that "in the absence of evidence suggesting Congress intended subsequent legislation to affect existing treaty rights, and in the event the enactments conflict, the Treaty must prevail .... [T] here is no evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the Article VIII(l) right in any way when it enacted Title VII and the ADEA." 15 But there is likewise no evidence that Congress intended these treaty provisions to create a broad loophole that would enable foreign corporations to violate Title VII and the civil rights of their American employees. The record is silent and provides no support to either side. How would one guess that the 1964 Congress would answer the following question: In passing this legislation did you intend to assure that Ford and General Motors can no longer discriminate on the basis of sex, but that such discrimination is permissible at Honda's American plant?
The above court also noted that federal statutes should not be construed to violate a treaty unless there is no other possible construction. 16 But here would seem to be the exception that proves the rule: it is an impossible construction to assume that Congress acted to stop discrimination in America by Americans while allowing it to continue unchecked if perpetrated by Japanese (or Korean or Greek or Italian) corporate branches operating here. Finally, treaties, including the FCN Treaty in its various iterations, supercede inconsistent state law as well. [Vol. 55:1
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III. THE CASES
This section looks at the various opinions on the issue over a twenty-year period. Most involve the Japanese Treaty, but others examine a similar provision in treaties with Denmark, Korea, Greece, and Italy. The claims involve sex discrimination and national origin discrimination under Title VII, and age discrimination under the ADEA. In the first case, Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 18 
2002]
claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
3 1 But the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York found nothing in the history of the Treaty that would convince it that a foreign corporation had an absolute privilege to hire professionals without regard for American laws prohibiting discrimination.
32
The court first noted that although some twenty-five post-World War II treaties contained substantially similar provisions, the legislative reports and testimony are silent as to their actual intent. 33 However, the legislative history of two 1955 treaties (Haiti and Turkey) containing the same provisions convinced the court that: "[t]he purpose of these provisions was to exempt specialized employees of foreign countries and companies from the admission requirements of the host country in specialized areas of endeavor. It was not intended to immunize foreigners from claims under the host country's employment discrimination laws." 34 Further, the court noted that the Thailand Treaty was ratified by the Senate in 1967, three years after Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and no discussion took place regarding the Treaty's effect on Title VII. 35 The court concluded that the only possible inference was that the Treaty was not intended to exempt foreign companies from Title VII. 36 The court saw the provision as primarily aimed at granting foreign nationals "treaty trader" status under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 37 which allows aliens from nations with which the United States has a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to enter the United States to operate an enterprise without being considered an immigrant subject to immigration quotas and other restrictions. 38 The court concluded with the important observation that "[a] different ruling would provide an unjustified loophole with wide ranging effects for the enforcement of Title VII. ' The court concluded that discrimination on the basis of Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ under certain circumstances based on factors such as, inter alia, "acceptability to those persons with whom the company ... does business." 42 As a practical matter, this would result in exactly the structure that emerged at Sumitomo New York: American women working in clerical roles for Japanese men.
The Avagliano plaintiffs were past and present female secretarial employees of Sumitomo (America). All but one was a United States citizen; the exception was a Japanese citizen living in the United States. 43 The suit was a class action in which they argued that Sumitomo's practice of hiring only male Japanese citizens to top level positions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Avagliano I, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, holding that neither sex discrimination nor national origin discrimination actions could be brought under § 1981, dismissed that portion of the claim. However, the court held that because Sumitomo had incorporated in the United States, it was not covered by Article VIII(l), and certified this issue for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
47
In Avagliano 11, the Second Circuit reversed in part.
4 8 Initially, the court concluded that the Treaty parties intended Article VIII(l) to cover locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign companies, thus protecting Sumitomo Japan's American subsidiary.
4 9 However, the court held that the Treaty language nevertheless did not protect Sumitomo from Title VII. 5 0 Finally, the court held Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ for high-level employment with a Japanese owned domestic corporation, and thus remanded the matter to determine if Sumitomo's employment practices might fit this exception to Title VII. 58 Any other interpretation of the Treaty would create an "unreasonable distinction" between American subsidiaries of Japanese companies and Japanese companies operating in the United States through subsidiaries. 59 Turning to Article VIII(l), the court concluded that C. Itoh was exempt from American employment discrimination laws to the extent that it could favor Japanese over Americans in executive and technical positions. 60 The court rejected Spiess's argument that Article ViIII() should be read to grant national treatment to the Japanese in their employment decisions. 
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noting that employment discrimination laws "occupy a high priority on the nation's agenda," the court applied the rule that congressional intent to abrogate a Treaty provision with subsequent legislation must be clearly expressed, 63 and found no such expression. 64 Finally, the court held that any right to discriminate pursuant to the Treaty was not violative of Article 55 of the United Nations Charter, 65 which encourages respect for all human rights regardless of race, sex, language, or religion. The court reached its conclusion because the issue at hand was national origin discrimination (not one of the enumerated characteristics), the Charter was not a self-executing obligation, and Title VII did not serve to execute the Charter but rather was a completely independent statute. 69. Id. The court rejected the argument that differences in the language of the two treaties were significant. Id. at *2. The Japanese Treaty allowed foreign companies to select executives "of their choice" whereas the Danish Treaty allowed selection "regardless of nationality." Id.
70. Id. at *3. Curiously, the Linskey court does not mention the Reavley dissent, Spiess 1, 643 F.2d at 363, which supports its position. The Court first looked at whether Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty provided a defense to a Title VII employment discrimination suit against an American subsidiary of a Japanese company. 76 The Court began its analysis by noting that interpretation of the treaty "must, of course, begin with the language of the Treaty itself. The clear import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories.,' 77 Accordingly, the Court turned to the Treaty language 78 that allowed companies of Japan or the United States to hire certain upper level employees of their choice while in the other country's territory.
79
The Court noted the ironic fact that these provisions were enacted at the insistence of the United States despite the opposition of other countries, including Japan, to protect the employment of Americans abroad, and "to prevent the imposition of ultranationalistic policies with respect to essential executive and technical personnel."
80
Having concluded that the Treaty "clearly" only applied to the companies of one country operating in the other, the Court turned to the definitional section of the Treaty, Article XXII(3), which states that a company incorporated in the territory of a party is a company of that party.
Based upon the language of Article XXII(3), the Court concluded that Sumitomo was a company of the United States, not of Japan, and as such could not "invoke the rights provided in Article VIII(I), which are available only to companies of Japan operating in the United States and to companies of the United States operating in Japan." '82 The Court then noted that the governments of Japan and the United States, speaking through the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department respectively, agreed with the Court's interpretation of the Treaty.
8 3 In light of these facts, the Court stated:
Our role is limited to giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties. When the parties to a treaty both agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation. 84 The Court concluded that Sumitomo was not covered by Article VIII(1) of the Treaty, vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded. 85 This ending would have accorded American workers in the employ of the American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations all the rights protected by Title VII. However, at the end of the opinion was footnote nineteen, which stated: [Vol. 55:1
We express no view as to whether Japanese citizenship may be a bona fide occupational qualification for certain positions at Sumitomo or as to whether a business necessity defense may be available. There can be little doubt that some positions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in the United States call for great familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business practices of that country. However, the Court of Appeals found the evidentiary record insufficient to determine whether Japanese citizenship was a bona fide occupational qualification for any of Sumitomo's positions within the reach of Article VIII(l). Nor did it discuss the bona fide occupational qualification exception in relation to respondents' sex discrimination claim or the possibility of a business necessity defense. Whether Sumitomo can support its assertion of a bona fide occupational qualification or a business necessity defense is not before us.
We also express no view as to whether Sumitomo may assert any Article VII(I) rights of its parent. 86 Thus, the Court left open two avenues with which to undermine the purpose of Title VII: (1) a finding that Japanese citizenship was a BFOQ would result in a homogeneous management team of all Japanese ethnic males; and (2) a finding that an American subsidiary could assert the Treaty rights of its Japanese parent would put Treaty Article VIII(l) at odds with Title VII. Both avenues of attack on Title VII would eventually be explored.
The two issues thus raised were not answered by the case itself, as the class action was settled after about four more years of discovery and negotiation. 87 The ambiguity as to the applicability of the BFOQ defense clearly affected the settlement terms. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in approving the settlement, stated that "[it is not clear how broad a BFOQ defense would have been recognized by the Court in this case, but it may be assumed that this defense would have limited the scope of any relief granted to some or all of the class." ' 88 The company was required to make good faith efforts to place women in twenty-three to twenty-five percent of the company's exempt positions. However, the top ten management spots were still to be staffed by rotating employees from the Japanese parent, 89 clearly resulting in the positions being filled by male Japanese nationals. The agreement also required that after three years, five percent of the women in exempt jobs would obtain senior management positions, and seven percent would obtain senior sales positions. 90 The company also agreed to provide back-pay and damages. Title VII. 96 However, the case is instructive as to the extent of protection from domestic antidiscrimination that a similar treaty provision allows. 9 7 In light of the court's careful review of the Treaty's legislative history, the court concluded that it contained: "substantial evidence that Article XII was intended to be a narrow privilege to employ Greek citizens for certain high level positions, not a wholesale immunity from compliance with labor laws prohibiting other forms of employment." '98 The court noted that the post-World War II treaties were negotiated in the context of percentile restrictions that required American companies working abroad to hire certain percentages of host country citizens. 99 The treaties were enacted before the Civil Rights Act or the ADEA. The court noted that nine states had already enacted antidiscrimination employment laws, even though there was nothing in the legislative history of the treaties that suggested they were intended to override these laws, and a State department spokesman stated that such laws would be unaffected.
100
The court did hold that the Treaty would prevail over Michigan law if the plaintiff were to argue on remand that citizenship (discrimination upon which Michigan law does prohibit) and national origin (discrimination upon which Michigan does not prohibit) are synonymous. 102 a case not involving sexual discrimination, but rather involving discrimination based on national origin and age, and also not involving Japan, but rather involving South Korea, albeit a similar culture and an identical Treaty provision. 1 03 The court held that the BFOQ exception not only applied but should be construed more broadly in the international context in light of Article VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty. 104 Next, the court concluded that conflicts between Article VIII(l) and Title VII must be resolved in favor of the Treaty. 105 Further, the plaintiffs were held not to prevail just by proving "disparate impact," as they could in the case of domestic corporations under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 10 6 rather, they were faced with the more difficult burden of proving intent to discriminate.
107
Thomas MacNamara, a fifty-seven-year-old American citizen, began working for Korean Airlines (KAL) in 1974.108 KAL discharged six American managers nationally and replaced them with four Korean citizens, replacing MacNamara with a forty-two-year-old Korean man who previously had been in charge of KAL's Washington office. 109 MacNamara argued that KAL had discriminated against him "on the basis of race, national origin and age, and additionally that he was entitled to recover because 'all of Defendant's American Sales Managers in the United States were replaced by Koreans."' 110 KAL's motion to dismiss was based on the argument that its conduct was privileged under the terms of the Korean FCN Treaty, which like the Japanese Treaty provides in Article VIII(l) that companies of either party are allowed to hire certain upper level employees of their choice within the other country. 111 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had held that Title VII and the ADEA were in conflict with Article VIII(l) of the Treaty and that the Treaty controlled in employment situations involving essential personnel that favored Korean citizens. 112 The Third Circuit noted that the district court's decision was consistent with Spiess 1,113 in which the Fifth Circuit held that the wholly owned American subsidiary of a Japanese company was protected by the Treaty. The Third Circuit then turned to the Second Circuit's analysis of Avagliano II, describing its position as suggesting that:
The Treaty and Title VII could be reconciled by reference to Title VII's "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception. Although ordinarily the BFOQ exception is narrowly construed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that interpreting it more broadly in the context of FCN Treaties was warranted by the terms of Article VIII(l) and would give foreign employers reasonable latitude to hire solely nationals for its management positions. 115 Further, the court took heed of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the BFOQ exception in the international context, which justified discrimination where:
The unique requirements of a Japanese company doing business in the United States, including such factors as a person's (1) Japanese linguistic and cultural skills, (2) knowledge of Japanese products, markets, customs, and business practices, (3) familiarity with the personnel and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in Japan, and (4) acceptability to those persons with whom the company or branch does business.
116
As discussed more fully below, the fourth basis provides an avenue for sexual discrimination for the American subsidiaries of any foreign nation whose culture finds men more "acceptable" than women in business relations. 117 However, the court noted that the Supreme Court vacated the judgment, leaving open the issues discussed in the final footnote.
118
Because the court agreed that MacNamara was an "executive" within the meaning of the Treaty and that the right to "engage" 119 foreign nationals must include the right to replace an American with a foreign national, the court was confronted with the issues raised by other circuits in Spiess I, Avagliano 11, and Wickes. 120 The court stated:
We agree with the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that Article VIII(l) goes beyond securing the right to be treated the same as domestic companies and that its purpose, in part, is to assure foreign corporations that they may have their business in the host country managed by their own nationals if they so desire.
121
The court saw no conflict between the Treaty, Title VII, and the ADEA, which proscribe discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, or age, 12 2 where the company was simply hiring its own nationals. 123 Thus, a foreign corporation could not "deliberately" reduce the age of its workforce by hiring younger nationals. 124 However, the court stated:
On the other hand, to the extent Title VII and the ADEA proscribe personnel decisions based on citizenship solely because of their disparate impact on older managers, a particular racial group, or persons whose ancestors are not from the 
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foreign country involved, we perceive a potential conflict and conclude that it must be resolved in favor of Article VIII(l). 1
25
The court agreed with the parties that Article VIII(l) gave foreign businesses "the right to engage 'executive personnel ... of their choice' ... [and that this power] includes the right to discriminate on the basis of citizenship; thus foreign businesses clearly have the right to choose citizens of their own nation as executives because they are such citizens." ' 126 However, the court rejected KAL's argument that Article VIII(l) provides immunity from Title VII and the ADEA for any executive hiring decision that favors a citizen of one's own nation.
127
Turning to the issue of the Treaty versus the antidiscrimination statutes, the court concluded that in the "absence of evidence suggesting Congress intended subsequent legislation to affect existing treaty rights, and in the event the enactments conflict, the Treaty must prevail .... [T] here is no evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the Article VIII(l) right in any way when it enacted Title VII and the ADEA." 12 8 Further, the court found no conflict between proscribed national origin discrimination and permitted citizenship discrimination, describing them as "distinct phenomena," and holding that the trier of fact can distinguish one from the other.
129
The court, having held that KAL could not purposefully or intentionally discriminate on the basis of age, race, or national origin, noted that Title VII and the ADEA, following Griggs, prohibit "facially neutral employment practices [that] have a discriminatory effect or 'disparate impact' on protected groups, without proof that the employer adopted these practices with a discriminatory motive." '130 Noting that imposing such a standard would "pose a substantial problem in disparate impact litigation for corporations hailing from countries, including perhaps Korea, whose populations are largely homogeneous," the court concluded that disparate impact liability under Title VII and the ADEA conflicted with Article VIII(1) and could not be imposed.
13 1 Thus, MacNamara was forced to prove the more difficult point that KAL's intent was to discriminate against him on the basis of his age.
H. Fortino v. Quasar Co.
Further eroding the protection accorded to Americans, the Seventh Circuit in Fortino v. Quasar Co., 132 held that an American corporation could assert the Treaty rights of its Japanese parent in defending a discrimination claim. 133 However, Judge Posner's opinion is based at least in part on a factual misunderstanding of Japanese culture.
Quasar is a division of an American subsidiary wholly owned by Matsushita of Japan.
134 After a year in which Quasar lost $20 million, Matsushita sent Mr. Nishikawa from Japan to correct the problem. 135 In the reorganization, a number of American executives were fwed, including plaintiffs Fortino, Meyers, and Schultz. No Japanese nationals were fired, although two were rotated back to Japan and replaced with one Japanese national. 136 All Japanese nationals received pay increases; none of the retained Americans received pay increases. 137 Two of the three Japanese-Americans, none of whom were executives, were fired. 138 In a videotape (the admission of which was ultimately held to be reversible error) another Japanese expatriate stated that the reorganization of another Quasar group would result in a younger average age which, in turn, would enable these younger, more vigorous employees to spend more time helping the other staff. 139 The plaintiffs claimed age and national origin discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII. 140 The judge and jury agreed, awarding $2.5 million in damages and $400,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. 14 1
While Title VII protects Americans of non-Japanese origin from discrimination in favor of persons of Japanese origin, it does not forbid discrimination on the ground of citizenship, Judge Posner stated. 142 Further, even though citizenship and national origin are "highly correlated" in countries like Japan, he concluded that using this fact to infer national origin discrimination would "nullify" the Treaty, regardless of whether one is attempting to prove intent or disparate impact.
143
Judge Posner, noting the Supreme Court's expression in footnote nineteen of the Sumitomo decision, then turned to the key issue: whether Quasar, not a Japanese company "in a technical sense," could rely on the Treaty. 144 The court concluded that, at least on the facts presented, a subsidiary may assert a parent's Treaty right "at least to the extent necessary to prevent the treaty from being set at naught." 145 But what facts would justify the opposite conclusion? Judge Posner asked:
But suppose a Japanese company buys an American company, fires all of its new subsidiary's occidental executives because it is prejudiced against occidentals, and replaces them with Japanese citizens. The question would then arise whether the treaty of friendship in effect confers a blanket immunity from Title VII. 
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origin discrimination the fact that two of Quasar's Japanese-American employees were fired. 147 Judge Posner seems to believe that since the Japanese-Americans had a national origin in Japan but were not Japanese citizens, this demonstrates that firing decisions were made on the basis of citizenship, not national origin or race. This assumption requires that the Japanese nationals harbor a national origin based affection for Japanese-Americans that they apparently ignored in making personnel decisions based solely on citizenship. But in fact the opposite is the case; Japanese nationals are uncomfortable with what they perceive as the ambiguous loyalties of Japanese-Americans and are actually more at ease with white Americans who present no such ambiguities. Thus, Quasar's decision to fire two of the three Japanese-Americans provided no evidence of whether Fortino was fired because he was not ethnically Japanese or because he was not a Japanese citizen.
Turning to the ADEA claim, the court held that there was enough evidence of age discrimination to make a case before the jury, but stated that there must be a new trial because of two errors by the lower court, Theodore Papaila argued that Uniden America, an Indiana corporation and subsidiary of Uniden Corporation (Uniden Japan), an electronics manufacturer, breached his contract on April 1, 1992, by reducing his compensation, demoting him to the position of Vice President, and engaging in a pattern of discriminatory conduct based on his age, race, and national origin, and ultimately firing him.
152
Papaila sued under Title VII for race and national origin discrimination, and under the ADEA for age discrimination. Uniden America defended by asserting that the Treaty allowed it to exercise the rights of Uniden Japan, its parent corporation, to favor Japanese citizens in employment, and therefore, it was not liable for dis-147. Id. at 393-94. 148. Id. at 394-95. First, a videotape was admitted, in which Mr. Omoto stated that the reorganization of another Quasar group would result in a younger average age which, in turn, would enable these younger, more vigorous employees to spend more time helping the other staff. Id. at 395. The court held this was inadmissible because Omoto was in an entirely different division of Quasar and had no part in the firing of the plaintiffs. Id. 395-96. Second, Anthony Mirabelli, who was also fired from Quasar but who was not a plaintiff, testified that Nishikawa's predecessor told him that Nishikawa "planned 'to reduce costs by targeting the older employees' for termination." Id. at 396. However, even though Mirabelli was listed on a list of 109 "may call" witnesses, the court held that Fortino had violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) by failing to supplement an early discovery request to warn Quasar of Mirabelli's "smoking gun" testimony, and that the appropriate sanction should have been to bar Mirabelli's testimony. Id. at 396-97.
149. Id. at 394-95. Fortino signed the release in exchange for additional severance benefits but testified at trial that he did not understand it. Id. at 394. The jury's belief of this "went beyond the bounds of reason." Id.
150 Uniden did not dispute that such employees were treated differently than American employees, and argued that the only basis for Papaila's claims of race and national origin discrimination is the preferential treatment given to Japanese expatriates. 154 The court noted that the Supreme Court had held that a subsidiary incorporated in the United States is not directly covered by Article VIII(l), but that it had left open in footnote nineteen in Sumitomo the question of whether an American company could assert its Japanese parent's rights under Article VIII(l), and then noted that Fortino was the only opinion to address that issue. 155 Fortino had held that an American subsidiary of a Japanese parent company could assert the Article VIII(l) FCN Treaty rights of its parent. The Papaila court decided to follow the Seventh Circuit and concluded that "Uniden must be allowed to assert the treaty rights of Uniden Japan in order to 'prevent the treaty from being set at naught."' 156 However, the court added, a Japanese company does not have "blanket authority" to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but "[t]he FCN Treaty language does, however, mean that '[clompanies have a right to decide which executives and technicians will manage their investment in the host country, without regard to host country laws."" 159 The court noted, however, a company still might succeed in such an argument "under appropriate circumstances," such as where the discriminatory decision was made in Japan by the parent and imposed upon the subsidiary.
160
W. Andrews Kirmse was fired from his management position in Hotel Nikko of San Francisco, Inc., a California corporation, which in turn is wholly owned by a Japanese corporation. 16 1 After he was replaced by a Japanese national, Kirsme filed suit alleging four causes of action: breach of contract, discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and intentional interference with contractual relations. 162 The trial court granted summary 164 This is the strongest possible interpretation of the Sumitomo holding. The court next turned to Justice Reavley's Spiess I dissent, describing it as a "remarkably detailed and cogent textual analysis of the treaty . . 165 The court then concluded that "[t]he Supreme Court evidently found the [Reavley] opinion persuasive since it vacated the Spiess I judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Sumitomo decision."
166 Endorsement of the court's opinion is also a bit of a stretch, as the Supreme Court likely would have vacated and remanded Spiess I regardless of the dissent.
The court then turned to the Fortino decision and the Papaila case that "followed the Fortino decision without adding any new analysis." 167 The court noted that in Fortino, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Sumitomo on the "slender factual basis" that the plaintiffs in Sumitomo failed to allege that the Japanese parent had dictated the subsidiary's discriminatory behavior. 168 The court concluded: "We doubt that this distinction has much practical significance. The parent company will always have the power to control the management of its subsidiary... ,"169 The court-assailed the Fortino court's assertion that any other conclusion would render the Treaty's protection meaningless.
17 0 Again turning to Judge
Reavley's dissent in Spiess I, the court stated that the drafters of the Treaty had gone to great pains to distinguish the rights of foreign corporations operating in the United States and domestically incorporated subsidiaries of foreign corporations.
1
The court further stated that the purpose of the Treaty is to allow foreign companies to operate on an equal basis with domestic companies, in part by allowing them to form domestic subsidiaries. 172 Also, it is consistent with this purpose to subject foreign corporations to the same laws as the domestic ones with which they compete. 173 Finally, the court argued that the parent could avoid the problem by operating as a branch rather than a domestic subsidiary.
174
The court, however, did admit that the issue raised by the Sumitomo Court in footnote nineteen "continues to pose serious and unresolved questions.
' 175 The court concluded that "a domestic subsidiary of a Japanese company may well be able to fashion, under appropriate circumstances, a valid basis for asserting standing to raise the parent's treaty rights, at least with respect to certain employees., 
IV. ANALYSIS-LEAST POSSIBLE PROTECTION IS ACCORDED
The progression of the cases through the circuit courts delineates a path to the least amount of protection for American women (and others protected by Title VII and the ADEA) working for multinational companies of FCN Treaty partners, whether operating as domestically incorporated subsidiaries or as branches. This Part first critically reviews that progression.
First, this Part begins with an ambiguous Treaty provision that allows companies of one party to "engage accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice."
192 This issue was addressed correctly the first time a court faced it. Recall that in Linskey the Danish parent argued, inter alia, that the Treaty protected it from claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
19 3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that " [w] hile this defense to a Title VII action is a novel one, the history of the provision belies any claim that a foreign corporation has an absolute privilege to hire professional and other specialized employees of their choice irrespective of the American laws prohibiting employment discrimination."
194
The court first noted that although some twenty-five post-World War II treaties contained substantially similar provisions, the legislative reports and testimony are silent as to their actual intent. 195 However, the legislative history of two 1955 treaties--one with Haiti, one with Turkey-containing the same provisions convinced the court that: "the purpose of these provisions was to exempt specialized employees of foreign countries and companies from the admissions requirements of the host country in specialized areas of endeavor. It was not intended to immunize foreigners from claims under the host country's employment discrimi- The court concluded that the only possible inference was that the Treaty was not intended to exempt foreign companies from Title VII. 198 The court saw the provision as primarily aimed at granting foreign nationals "treaty trader" status under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,199 which allows aliens from nations with which the United States has a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, to enter the United States to operate an enterprise without being considered an immigrant subject to immigration quotas and other restrictions. 200 The court concluded with the important observation that "[a] different ruling would provide an unjustified loophole with wide ranging effects for the enforcement of Title VII.
'' 20 1
Second, there exists what should be a not so ambiguous Treaty provision that states that for purposes of the Treaty, a company is simply a company of the country in which it is incorporated. Thus, for example, a subsidiary of a Japanese corporation that is incorporated under the laws of New York should clearly be a New York corporation, and not subject to the first Treaty provision, regardless of how it is interpreted. That should end the discussion for domestically incorporated subsidiaries, but as demonstrated, it does not.
The best refutation of this argument is found in Spiess I. Judge Reavley's dissent remains the best articulated rebuttal to the position held by the majority of circuits; it has been unrefuted (but essentially ignored) after more than twenty years. In Spiess 1, the majority rejected Spiess's argument that Article VIII(1) should be read to grant national treatment to the Japanese in their employment decisions.
20 2 Instead, the court found it apparent from the phrase "of their choice" that Article VIII(l) did not merely grant national treatment, but rather was an "absolute rule" permitting the Japanese to staff their overseas investments with their nationals.
20 3 But if it is truly absolute, why can't Japanese companies hiring executives "of their choice" choose to hire only white males for the positions staffed by Americans? The court created a conundrum by holding that Article VIII(1) is an absolute rule, but applying it as absolute only as to nationality.
Judge Reavley began his dissent by stating that the purpose of the definitional section of the Treaty, Article XXII(3), was to bridge the cultural gap between the 201. Linskey v. Heidelberg E., Inc., 470 F. Supp. at 1187. Linskey had also argued that the defendants discriminated against women, but the court held that as a male he lacked standing to make the argument. The line between Japanese incorporation and American incorporation is a bright and distinct one. If Japanese investors choose to cross that line in order to gain all the benefits of our legal system on a basis equal with American corporations, I find it eminently reasonable that they accept legal responsibilities and duties on an equal basis as well.
209
Third, turn to Title VII, which protects against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion, but has its own inherent weakness: the BFOQ exception.
2 10 The exception allows discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, and national origin, but not race, where such characteristic is a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. ' 2 11 This presents a loophole in the best of times, one that can be expanded and exploited by one intent upon turning back the clock in the field of employment discrimination. Why interpret it even more broadly in the international context where the possibility for abuse by a foreign corporation with a worse record of sex discrimination is even greater? What is the worst possible way to interpret the potential ambiguities and conflicts created by the interaction of the Treaty and Title VII? It is, of course, the result that languishes as the law today, presumably imparting a chilling effect on any future litigation or settlement negotiations.
The courts began to move astray with Avagliano H, in which the Second Circuit, wherein many international businesses are headquartered or represented, held that the Treaty did protect locally incorporated subsidiaries of Treaty partners and, although it did hold that the Treaty did not exempt it from Title VII, held that Japanese citizenship could be a BFOQ.
2 12 The court was wrong on the first issue and unaware of the implications of its holding on the second issue, particularly its statement that in determining whether Japanese citizenship was a BFOQ, the court could consider, in the words of the district court, inter alia, "acceptability to those persons with whom the company does business." 2 13 What the court failed to realize is that as a practical matter, this would result in exactly the structure that emerged at Sumitomo New York: American women working in clerical roles for Japanese men. This is because at the executive level the Japanese workforce is extremely homogeneous, consisting of men who in addition to being all of the same national origin, are all of the same race. Thus the "acceptability" language used by the court allows a Japanese company to legitimately (as the law stands) find Japanese nationality a BFOQ and hire only acceptable applicants who will all be of the same race and gender. The Fifth Circuit in Spiess I followed Avagliano II in finding that a domestically incorporated subsidiary of a Japanese parent was indeed covered by the Treaty, 209. Id. at 369. 210. Discussion about the propriety of the BFOQ exception and how broadly or narrowly it should be applied in the wholly domestic context are worthy topics for consideration, but outside the scope of this Article. As noted above, the case thereafter settled and the task of answering those two questions fell upon the Third Circuit in MacNamara, which held not only that a BFOQ exception could be applied, but that the exception should be applied more broadly in the international context. 2 17 If that wasn't enough, the court then held that plaintiffs could not use Griggs' "disparate impact" analysis, but must prove intent to discriminate.
2 18 How, one asks, can the plaintiff prove intent, especially in the new, broader international standard, when dealing with an extremely homogeneous, male-dominated nation such as Japan, or in MacNamara's case, Korea? This heightened standard must inevitably impose a chilling effect on litigation.
Further, why should an American subsidiary of a foreign corporation be allowed to assert its parent's Treaty rights? MacNamara involved a Korean branch operation, not a subsidiary, so the issue of a subsidiary invoking the parent's Treaty rights was not answered there. But the Seventh Circuit in Fortino and the Fifth Circuit in Papaila soon held that the answer was "yes." This flies in the face of the plain language of the Treaty. Equally clear, it is fair to require a foreign company seeking Treaty protection to simply operate as KAL did, as a branch, thus avoiding the whole issue. It seems fair to require that if a company wants the benefits of incorporation under state law within the United States, that it live up to the responsibilities that incorporation entails.
Thus, the result that stands today is that branch offices and domestically incorporated subsidiaries of a Treaty partner may invoke Treaty protection. They may, to the extent still burdened by Title VII, invoke the BFOQ exception for national origin discrimination; they may have the degree of the exception construed more broadly than in a wholly domestic situation; and they may be immune from a Griggs "disparate impact" analysis, requiring the plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent.
As a final point of contention, recall that the court rejected Spiess's argument that Article VIII(l) should be read to grant national treatment to the Japanese in their employment decisions. Instead, the court found it apparent from the phrase "of their choice" that Article VIII(l) did not merely grant national treatment but rather was an "absolute rule" permitting the Japanese to staff their overseas investments with their nationals.
2 19 But if it is truly absolute, why can't Japanese companies hiring executives "of their choice" choose to hire only white males for the positions staffed by Americans? The court created a conundrum by holding that Article VIII(l) is an absolute rule, but applying it as absolute only as to nationality. 
